Exploring Mongolia's Rare Earth Elements and Their Impact on Geopolitical Dynamics

Otgonjargal Davagsuren

Authors

Otgonjargal Davagsuren Graduate University of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia Author

Keywords:

rare earth elements, geopolitics, Mongolia, strategic location, China, Russia

Abstract

Mongolia's vast reserves of rare earth elements (REEs), including lithium and neodymium, position the country as a key actor in global geopolitics amid growing demand for sustainable technologies such as electric vehicles and wind turbines. This study explores how Mongolia's strategic geographic location — situated between China and Russia — together with its substantial REE resources, shapes its complex geopolitical relationships. China's control of over 90% of global REE production creates significant dependency risks for Mongolia, potentially limiting its autonomy. Conversely, Western nations such as the United States and the European Union view Mongolia as a vital alternative to reduce reliance on China. Russia plays a stabilizing role, reinforcing Mongolia's status as a geopolitical buffer. Drawing on classical geopolitical theories like Mackinder2019s Heartland theory and modern geo-economic frameworks, this analysis examines how Mongolia navigates competing influences. Although technological advancements enhance its strategic potential, challenges remain, including limited infrastructure and sovereignty concerns. By analyzing Mongolia's REE assets and international alignments, this study highlights both the opportunities and vulnerabilities facing the country in a resource-driven global order.

References

1. G. T. Topalidis, N. N. Kartalis, J. R. Velentzas, and C. G. Sidiropoulou, "New developments in geopolitics: A reassessment of theories after 2023," Soc. Sci., vol. 13, no. 2, p. 109, 2024, doi: 10.3390/socsci13020109.

2. A. L. Gulley, N. T. Nassar, and S. Xun, "China, the United States, and competition for resources that enable emerging technologies," Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., vol. 115, no. 16, pp. 4111-4115, 2018, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1717152115.

3. N. A. Mancheri, B. Sprecher, G. Bailey, J. Ge, and A. Tukker, "Effect of Chinese policies on rare earth supply chain resilience," Resources, Conserv. Recycl., vol. 142, pp. 101-112, 2019, doi: 10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.11.017.

4. Z. Wu, "Classical geopolitics, realism and the balance of power theory," J. Strateg. Stud., vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 786-823, 2018, doi: 10.1080/01402390.2017.1379398.

5. C. W. Su, K. Khan, M. Umar, and W. Zhang, "Does renewable energy redefine geopolitical risks?," Energy Policy, vol. 158, p. 112566, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112566.

6. J. H. Fan, A. Omura, and E. Roca, "Geopolitics and rare earth metals," Eur. J. Polit. Econ., vol. 78, p. 102356, 2023, doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102356.

7. W. Rabe, G. Kostka, and K. S. Stegen, "China's supply of critical raw materials: Risks for Europe's solar and wind industries?," Energy Policy, vol. 101, pp. 692–699, 2017, doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.09.019.

8. S. Kalantzakos, "The race for critical minerals in an era of geopolitical realignments," The Int. Spectator, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 1–16, 2020, doi: 10.1080/03932729.2020.1786926.