The "Institutional Strength Training" Framework: A Comparative Analysis of the Resource Curse and Governance Resilience in Norway, Botswana, and Venezuela (Applications for Mongolia)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.71222/5ddbrj45Keywords:
resource curse, institutional quality, Mongolia, sovereign wealth funds, blockchain governance, comparative political economyAbstract
This study examines the natural resource curse and the role of institutional quality in shaping socio-economic outcomes in resource-rich countries. Employing a qualitative comparative case study approach based on the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), it analyzes the governance trajectories of Norway, Botswana, and Venezuela, with particular attention to the evolving institutional context of Mongolia. Drawing on longitudinal data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) spanning 2000-2025, the analysis suggests that resource abundance is more likely to be associated with sustainable growth when mediated by credible fiscal rules and transparent oversight mechanisms. The study further explores the potential of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies-most notably blockchain and artificial intelligence-as potential "digital institutional stabilizers" capable of constraining rent-seeking behaviors in emerging economies. Overall, the findings indicate that institutional resilience should be understood not as a passive outcome of economic development, but as a dynamic process shaped by deliberate policy choices, including sovereign wealth funds designed to operate on a non-partisan basis and technology-enabled transparency arrangements.References
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